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Abstract 
 
Most of the existing literature on judicial interpretation of federal constitutions 
focuses either on individual federations or on comparative studies of specific judicial 
techniques and/or specific fields. This paper argues that the general interpretative 
philosophy underlying the judicial approach has a huge impact on the balance of power in 
a federation; an originalist interpretation tends to favour the constituent units, while 
progressive or ‘living’ constitutionalism tends to have a centripetal effect. However, even 
the adoption of an originalist approach is not sufficient to fully counter the general 
centralising trend noticeable in the constitutional jurisprudence of all the federations 
studied. Further, the analysis suggests that constitutional courts often adopt a different 
approach to interpretation in federalism-related issues than they do in other areas of 
constitutional law, such as fundamental rights. 
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“Federalism … means legalism - the predominance  
of the judiciary in the constitution -” 
- A.V. Dicey 
1. Introduction 
 
Constitutions play a special role in federal systems. A federal constitution, while 
retaining all the essential characteristics of unitary constitutions, is at the same time 
conceived of as a compact between theoretically sovereign entities. This traditional vision is 
not directly applicable to federations formed by disassociation, but in these cases it is 
precisely the creation of entities with a specifically defined sovereignty that gives the federal 
constitution its special character. However, contemporary constitutional discourse often 
tends to overlook, or at least ignore, this particularity of federal constitutions. In most of 
the older federations, sovereignty-based arguments are not as prevalent today as they were 
in the early stages of constitutional debate. Appeal to ‘fundamental principles’ is more 
common in other areas, of which the most evident is that of fundamental rights. Even 
when the ‘federal balance’ and ‘state sovereignty’ are invoked, the notion of the 
constitutional document as a compact, or an agreement between the governments 
constituting the federation, does not come to the fore. 
When a federal constitution is looked at in this classical perspective, the distribution 
of powers and functions between the federation and its constituent units as contained in 
the constitutional document takes on a particular significance. This distribution is not 
merely a question of practical convenience; the constitutional provisions defining legislative 
and executive powers are in effect the concrete embodiment of the theoretical sharing of 
sovereignty that federalism is supposed to entail. Even more so than in unitary systems, 
precise attention to these provisions is thus fundamental both to understanding federalism 
and to ‘working’ federalism. This explains the above quotation from Dicey about legalism 
in federations and the role of the judiciary: given this conception of what a federal 
constitution is, the interpretation and application of constitutional rules and principles are 
essential factors that determine how federalism functions in practice. Specifically, the 
interpretation of the division of legislative competence laid out in the constitution plays an 
 E -   
 
4
important role in defining what one may call the federal equilibrium or the federal balance, 
i.e. the balance of power between the federation and the constituent units.  
This role is well-recognized by both scholars and practitioners. There is a vast 
literature on how constitutional courts interpret certain specific grants of power in various 
federal constitutions: the commerce clause in the United States, the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ clause in Canada, the corporations power in Australia, and so on. 
Comparative studies often focus on the evolution of case-law in these areas in different 
federations. There is also extensive analysis of specific interpretative concepts applied by 
the courts, such as the negative commerce clause, or the doctrine of pith and substance, or 
the notion of occupied field preemption.  In-depth comparative studies of these technical 
aspects, while rare, have also been attempted (Gilbert 1986; Taylor 2006). 
However, there is little comparative work that attempts to coherently analyse trends 
in constitutional interpretation in federations in a more general perspective. This is because 
of the extremely heterogeneous character of federalism jurisprudence in different 
federations. Among the older federations, in particular, the body of case-law on the 
division of powers is so vast, and so complex, that attempting to make sense of any one 
system is in itself a difficult task. An attempt to reach comparative conclusions is therefore 
fraught with the danger of losing oneself in a swamp of technical analysis at the one 
extreme, and, at the other, the danger of relying on – or arriving at – too-general notions of 
how and why constitutional decision-making actually proceeds in this fundamental area.  
These epistemological remarks are necessary in order to clearly define the limited 
parameters of the analysis attempted here. This paper studies the impact not of specific 
interpretative techniques but of the more general interpretative philosophy underlying 
constitutional decision-making in several federations. I limit my discussion of actual cases 
to a minimum, referring instead to more detailed and in-depth work pertaining to each of 
the jurisdictions studied.  
I start with the hypothesis that the judicial approach to constructing the specific 
constitutional provisions allocating powers between the units of a federation is 
conditioned, implicitly or explicitly, by how judges conceive of the nature and function of 
the constitutional document. The process of determining what a constitution says 
necessarily involves certain assumptions as to what a constitution is. It is hoped that more 
detailed and systematic, technical analyses of case-law will benefit from an understanding 
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of how these assumptions influence and condition the interpretation of the constitutional 
division of powers. 
I will attempt to show that an originalist interpretation that sees the constitution as 
a fixed body of rules tends to favour the constituent units in a federation, whereas 
progressive or ‘living’ constitutionalism, i.e. treating the constitution as a set of general 
principles to be adapted to changing circumstances, tends to have a centripetal effect on 
the federal balance. It is also true, however, that all the federations studied have shown a 
general tendency towards centralisation over the course of their evolution. While a full 
analysis of the myriad economic and social factors at work in this process is beyond the 
scope of this paper, I will discuss how some of them influence the interpretation of the 
legislative competences attributed by federal constitutions. Particular attention will be paid 
to the oft-neglected aspect of scientific and technological development. These factors are 
analysed through the prism of the formal distribution of powers in constitutional 
provisions; the study shows that certain structural elements of this distribution in several 
federations tend to facilitate the process of centralisation. 
Finally, I will touch briefly on the question of whether constitutional courts adopt 
different interpretative philosophies in federalism-related issues than they do in other areas 
of constitutional law - such as fundamental rights - due to the particular nature of 
federalism jurisprudence, i.e. the definition not of the extent of state power but of the 
relative limits of power between different levels of government within the state. This 
suggests, further, that comparative studies of constitutional interpretation need to take into 
account not only the overall interpretative approach prevalent in different legal systems, 
but also how these approaches vary according to the subject matter in question. 
For this study I focus on the United States, Canada and Australia, and, additionally, 
on Austria due to the special importance of originalism in Austrian constitutional doctrine. 
Discussion of younger federations is limited for the simple reason that the originalism 
debate is less relevant in these federations: due to the relatively short period of time that 
has elapsed since the writing of the constitution, the divide between ‘original meaning’ and 
other possible meanings is much less significant. 
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2. Modes of  constitutional interpretation 
 
Constitutional scholarship and judicial doctrine have developed several different 
theories of constitutional interpretation. The subject has become an especially fashionable 
one in the last few decades, and there is no dearth of commentary in the area. It is hardly 
possible to elaborate an exhaustive list of the theoretical approaches developed in the 
academic literature, as each one comprises several variations and the same words are 
sometimes used to describe rather different approaches.I Further, the actual process of 
interpretation involves various steps and assumptions that one cannot always classify under 
a well-defined theory. “Meaning” itself is a nebulous concept that can refer to several 
different aspects and be defined in several different ways (Balkin 2009: 552; Lessig 1993: 
1174-1178). It is not my intention here to explore these issues in detail. 
However, for the limited purposes of this paper, it is possible to briefly identify the 
major strands of academic discourse on the subject, revolving around certain basic ‘modes’ 
of interpretation. Originalist approaches stress the need to interpret the constitution in 
light of its original meaning. In this perspective, the constitution provides a fixed set of 
rules for  governance, which are to be applied as such by the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches. Originalists argue that continuous evolution of these rules by judges 
defeats the very purpose of adopting a constitution (Kay 1998). They consider the 
alternatives to originalism as being incompatible with the democratic foundations of 
constitutionalism, allowing too much judicial discretion as well as admitting too much 
indeterminacy in applying the constitution (Scalia 1989). 
Opponents of originalism, on the other hand, believe that the constitution should 
be considered a living document that provides general guidelines and principles of 
governance. This approach emphasizes that fidelity to the constitution should not 
necessarily involve strict conformity to the framers’ intentions (Friedman and Smith 1998: 
6). Further, non-originalists point out that some of today’s cherished constitutional values 
would be incompatible with such a strict interpretation (Grey 1975: 710-714).  
Related to these notions is the debate between interpretivism and non 
interpretivism, i.e. whether or not judges should restrict themselves to applying norms 
explicit or implied in the text of the constitution. The interpretivist answer is in the 
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affirmative, while non interpretivists argue that judges may enforce norms and use 
principles not found within the constitutional document (Goldford 2005: 96; Grey 1975: 
703). 
Other ‘modes’ of interpretation often cited in academic literature are ‘textualism’, 
‘intentionalism’ and ‘purposive interpretation’. Some idea of the semantic hazards in this 
area can be had from the fact that textualism and intentionalism are sometimes considered 
two branches of originalism (Brest 1980; Lyons 1993), while some authors identify the 
search for the original ‘public meaning’ as a third branch (Smith 2007: 162-163). Others 
speak of textualism as a theory separate from - even opposed to – originalism, emphasizing 
the idea of an ‘objective’ textual meaning (Pushaw 2006; Nelson 2005). And in the same 
logic, ‘originalism’ is sometimes considered a synonym for ‘intentionalism’. Opponents of 
originalism have indeed pointed out that the term actually covers several disparate and even 
mutually contradictory theories (Colby and Smith 2009). Some commentators attempt, 
through various steps of theoretical and semantic argument, to put forward a synthesis of 
originalism and living constitutionalism (Balkin 2009). Finally, ‘progressive interpretation’ is 
sometimes contrasted not just with originalism but also with textualism in its independent 
form. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will work with a simplistic contrast between the 
two general ideas of original meaning-based interpretation - including all its various 
branches - and progressive interpretation, i.e. interpretation that seeks to adapt the 
constitution to changing circumstances, as they have been applied in federal systems. This 
admittedly reductionist approach is adopted as the subject of this paper is not an evaluation 
of - or a contribution to - theories of interpretation, but an analysis of how interpretation 
in federal constitutions conditions federal-state relations. The two very general conceptions 
of originalism and progressivism are therefore taken to represent two contrasting ways of 
defining the nature and functions of a constitutional document, i.e. whether it is to be 
conceived of as a fixed set of rules intended to rigidly define judicial, legislative and 
executive practice, or rather as a flexible framework that can be evolved and adapted. 
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3. The ‘original meaning’ of  federalism 
 
How do these different ways of approaching constitutional provisions influence 
how we conceive the relationship between the federal government and the states or 
provinces in a federation? Returning to the idea of the constitution as a compact, classical 
federalism doctrine envisioned the creation of a system in which the constituent units 
reserved significant spheres of power for themselves. In the United States and Australia, as 
in many other modern federations, this idea manifests itself in the residual competence 
which the constitution attributes to the states. The states were seen as equal partners in the 
system, retaining sovereignty in many areas of governmental action. 
Adherence to the original meaning of constitutional texts naturally favours this 
underlying vision of what a federation isII, and this translates into an interpretation of 
constitutional heads of power that is more likely to attempt to safeguard state sovereignty. 
Commerce clause jurisprudence in the United States provides a clear example: the generous 
interpretation of the commerce power since the New Deal of the 1930s up until some 
decisions of the Rehnquist court in the 1990s was very far from the original conception of 
the role of the federal government in regulating inter-state commerce, and it greatly eroded 
state legislative power in a number of areas. The federation was originally intended to have 
specific, well-defined powers, and the unlimited expansion of federal regulation to all 
things even remotely commercial was hardly compatible with this vision (Tushnet 2006: 
36-37). 
The idea of a progressive and adaptive interpretation was of course already present 
in American constitutional debate, having been invoked for example as far back as Chief 
Justice Marshall’s famous judgement in McCulloch v. Maryland [17 US 316 (1819)]. But 
despite subsequent shifts in judicial trends, it never translated into as one-sided a vision of 
the division of legislative power as during the New Deal period and after. The economic 
and political context for the New Deal court’s interpretation of the commerce power are of 
course common knowledge: the measures needed to lift the country out of the Great 
Depression required a new role for the federal government in regulating the economy, 
which put political pressure on the court to accept the constitutionality of the new federal 
 E -   
 
9
laws. This is certainly an example of how judicial interpretation of federalism provisions in 
the constitution provides a legal framework for the centralisation of power in a federation, 
while at the same time being shaped and influenced by ‘external’ economic, social and 
political factors. 
However, the progressive nature of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation was 
largely implicit, there being no clear and authoritative pronouncement on the interpretative 
methodology employed. This is in stark contrast to Canadian constitutional doctrine, where 
since 1930 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and then the Supreme Court of 
Canada, have clearly and explicitly stated that the constitution must be adapted to reflect 
changing circumstances, a principle embodied in the metaphor of the ‘living tree’. The 
‘living tree’ image comes from the Privy Council decision Edwards v. Attorney-General for 
Canada [(1930) AC 124], in one of the most famous passages in Canadian constitutional 
law: 
 
“The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits … 
Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board — it is certainly not their desire — to cut down the provisions of 
the Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation….” (per Lord Sankey). 
 
Edwards was actually a decision about a woman’s right to stand for election to the Senate. 
But it has been often cited in support of a generous interpretation of the legislative powers 
enumerated in the constitution (Hogg 2006: 87). Even before Edwards, the Privy Council 
tended to reject originalist arguments, refusing for example to admit evidence of the 
drafter’s intentions as relevant to the interpretative process (Hogg 2006: 74-79). However, 
this earlier period – as well as a handful of later Privy Council decisions – was certainly 
much more favourable to the provinces than the subsequent evolution of case-law under 
the Supreme Court.III 
 It is, of course, too simplistic to cast the ‘original meaning’ of Canadian federalism 
in the same mould as that of the United States. The drafters of the British North America 
Act were conscious of the need to avoid troubles such as those which occurred between 
the American States in the 19th century, and hence took a deliberate decision to create a 
strong central government. It is, however, no coincidence that the markedly centralising 
tendency in Canadian jurisprudence began after the adoption of the ‘living tree’ metaphor as 
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a guiding principle in constitutional interpretation. This shows that the centripetal effect of 
progressivism is not solely dependent on the contrast with an originally state- or province-
centred federalism.  
The place of originalism in Australian constitutional law is more ambiguous. In the 
first two decades of its existence, the High Court of Australia was very sensitive to the 
original understanding of federalism in the constitution: the restrictive interpretation of 
federal legislative competences and the ‘reserved powers’ doctrine was consistent with the 
drafters’ concern for preserving state sovereignty (Allan and Aroney 2008). The example of 
the United States was very influential, as the High Court worked with the double 
presumption that the drafters were aware of the evolution of American doctrine, and that 
the similarity between the two constitutions meant that they should generally be interpreted 
in the same manner. Faithfulness to original intentions was obviously reinforced by the fact 
that several High Court judges had themselves been involved in the drafting process (Allan 
and Aroney 2008: 266). 
However in its seminal decision Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide 
Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1920) 28 CLR 129], the High Court declared that the Constitution 
ought to be interpreted so as to give it its ‘natural’ and ‘clear’ meaning, and that the 
constitutional text itself was paramount. This brand of textualism - often called ‘literalism’ 
or, more generally, ‘legalism’ - dominated Australian judicial doctrine for most of the 20th 
century (Goldsworthy 2006; Selway and Williams 2005; Tucker 2002). 
While the rejection of originalism was not as explicit and systematic as it was in 
CanadaIV, the emphasis on the text tended to relegate the drafters’ intentions to the 
background, which allowed the Court to move away from its earlier approach towards one 
much more favourable to the federal government. For instance, before Engineers, the 
reserved powers doctrine had been invoked to interpret the federal heads of power in a 
holistic manner, so that what was impliedly left out of one head of power was not admitted 
under another. Thus, the grant of power with respect to ‘interstate commerce’ was 
interpreted as implying that purely intra-state commerce did not come under federal 
jurisdiction, and that other enumerated powers – such as the power with respect to 
‘corporations’ – were therefore not to be read in a manner that would permit federal 
regulation of commerce that did not have a clear interstate dimension. The move away 
from the drafter’s intentions meant that this interpretative approach was gradually rejected. 
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Under the new paradigm, each federal power was to be interpreted independently of the 
others; no restrictions were to be read into the words used in the grant of power by 
Sections 51 and 52 of the Constitution.V 
Whether or not one characterizes the post-Engineers approach as ‘progressive’, it is 
beyond doubt that the change in interpretative philosophy reflected an underlying change 
in how judges conceived of the relation between the federation and the States. In fact, the 
Engineer’s court explicitly rejected the classical American doctrine of double sovereignty - 
which until then had been followed in AustraliaVI – stating that federal powers needed to 
be interpreted generously in order to ensure that the federation could effectively handle 
issues requiring regulation on a national scale. This underlying problem of an increasing 
need for national regulation was of course similar to the one faced by the New Deal court 
in the United States. 
 
4. Austria: originalism concretized  
 
Austria provides a unique example of the dynamic discussed in this paper, due to 
the special role of originalism in Austrian constitutional law. According to the theory of 
'petrification' (Versteinerungstheorie), the words employed in constitutional provisions are 
‘petrified’ at the time of their coming into force, and must therefore be given the exact 
same meaning today as they had then (Douin 1977: 49-52; Gamper 2005: 15-16; Taylor 
2006: 98-103). The singularity of Austrian constitutional doctrine is that the theory of 
petrification is not an underlying philosophy or a guiding principle - as originalism or 
progressivism are in other jurisdictions - but a specific, well-established rule applied 
systematically in the process of interpreting the constitutional texts. 
This concretization of originalism as an interpretative technique means that the 
anti-centralising effects of originalism are even more evident in Austria. The constitutional 
division of powers in itself heavily favours the federation, as it is granted extensive 
exclusive competences as well as concurrent and framework competences. While the 
residual competence is attributed to the Länder, they have very few enumerated powers, 
and these only in certain carefully defined fields; if federal powers were to be interpreted 
broadly, there would be very little scope remaining for Länder legislation. The theory of 
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petrification helps to preserve state power by not allowing enumerated federal powers to 
be interpreted expansively. As their meaning and scope is ‘petrified’ in time, new areas of 
legislation cannot be accommodated under a certain head of power in the constitution. The 
categorical rejection of progressivism helps maintain the federal balance, albeit only to a 
certain extent. 
 
5. The structure of  the division of  powers 
 
Our discussion of the Austrian constitution demonstrates that, apart from external 
factors, the centripetal effect of progressive interpretation is also related to the manner in 
which powers are distributed in the constitution. As we have seen, the residual power is 
given to the states in many federations, but in the American and Australian model it is also 
the only power the constitution gives them. These constitutions do not contain an 
enumerated list of state powers. How does this affect judicial interpretation of the powers 
that are in fact enumerated, i.e. federal powers? 
There are several complex factors at work. Firstly, a deep-seated respect for the 
separation of powers influences how judges interpret legislative powers. Many courts start 
with the basic presumption that the legislature is acting within its competence. Being 
conscious of the need to avoid encroaching on legislative functions, judges tend to avoid a 
finding that otherwise validly adopted laws are in fact void for lack of legislative 
competence in a certain field.VII There is thus a predilection for ‘justifying’ the 
constitutionality of a law by bringing it within the scope of a certain head of power. 
Secondly, constitutional provisions are often framed in more general terms than ordinary 
statutes, and general terms allow for more flexible interpretation than specific terms. 
As a result, the meaning of the words used in the enumeration of powers - and 
hence the limits of the fields of power they define - are consistently open to a wider 
interpretation, which allows a wider variety of laws to be adopted within the scope of the 
same power. This is where the structure in which the division of powers is expressed 
becomes relevant: when state powers are not enumerated, they cannot benefit from this 
expansive interpretation. At the same time, in such cases, the expansion of federal 
enumerated powers is not limited by the existence of well-defined fields of state power; in 
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some ways, the enumeration of state powers provides a barrier against the ever-widening 
interpretation of federal fields of competence. Judges may also tend to favour specific 
enumerated powers over a vague and undefined ‘residual’ power. Thus, in federations 
where only federal powers are enumerated, there is a very marked tendency towards 
progressive centralisation (Herperger 1991). 
The question of a generous interpretation is related to the originalism-
progressivism debate, because in this context ‘progressive’ usually translates to ‘generous’. 
It is important to note that there need not be an automatic equation of the two: in 
principle, a progressive interpretation could very well demand a restrictive interpretation of a 
certain constitutional provision or head of power (Miller 2009: 13; Allan 2006: 6). But in 
practice, the progressive interpretation of an enumerated head of legislative power tends to 
broaden the scope of the power. Consequently, when the only enumerated powers are 
federal powers, a gradual erosion of state sovereignty becomes almost inevitable. 
But what about those federations where the constitution enumerates powers for the both 
the federation and the constituent units? The Canadian constitution, for example, contains 
two lists of enumerated powers: federal powers in Section 91 and provincial powers in 
Section 92. On the simple hypothesis that the generous interpretation of an enumerated 
competence expands the legislative power of the level of government concerned to the 
detriment of the other level, the fact that there are two lists of exclusive powers means that 
this dynamic can work in both directions, i.e. favouring either the federation or the 
provinces.VIII And, yes, despite the clear choice of progressivism over originalism, Canadian 
federalism jurisprudence presents a less one-sided picture of the division of legislative 
power than its Australian and American counterparts, at least in the 20th century. In fact, 
for several decades of Privy Council jurisprudence, it was the provinces that benefited from 
a generous interpretation of enumerated powers, as the provincial competence with respect 
to ‘property and civil rights’ was extended so as to cover a very wide range of legislation 
(Hogg 2007: 392, 499-500). 
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6. The overall centralising tendency 
 
But whatever the structure of the division of powers and the choice of 
interpretative approach, a general tendency towards centralisation in each of the 
federations studied can be clearly established.IX The enumeration of state powers or the 
emphasis on original meaning counter this tendency only to a certain extent. 
For example, despite the exception of the property and civil rights clause, on the whole the 
scope of federal powers in Canada has widened far more significantly than that of 
provincial powers, especially since the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1949. 
This can be explained in part by various external, i.e. non-constitutional 
developments. We have already seen how a perceived need for greater federal control over 
commercial affairs influences the choice of interpretative approach with respect to the 
division of powers. This aspect has been extensively analysed by scholars, in particular in 
the United States, and so I do not intend to explore it in greater detail here. 
However, another non-constitutional factor - much less remarked-upon - that 
shapes the interpretation of the heads of legislative power is the development of new 
technologies that require new forms of government regulation not always envisaged at the 
time of drafting. In such cases, a progressive interpretation is required almost by definition, 
since none of the existing constitutional provisions would be sufficient if understood strictly 
in their original sense. The equation of ‘progressive’ and ‘generous’ is quite justified in this 
context, as these developments usually do require an expansion of government power to 
deal with unforeseen situations. 
So, judges must decide how new technologies are accounted for in the division of 
legislative competence. In Canada, the Privy Council and later the Supreme Court were 
faced with several questions as to which level of government retained legislative power 
over matters such as telephony, television, aeronautics and atomic energy. But the very 
nature of these technologies often required uniform regulation on a national scale, as their 
application and functioning transcended provincial boundaries.X It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the decisions of both the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in these 
areas were generally in favour of the federal government, albeit sometimes based on very 
different reasoning. 
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Thus, the federation was held to retain legislative power with respect to aeronautics, 
at first by virtue of the federal competence to conclude international treaties [In Re 
Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada (1932) AC 54], and later under its residual 
‘peace, order and good governance’ power as it was a matter of national interest [Johannesson 
v. West St. Paul (1952) 1 SCR 292]. Telecommunications provides another example: the 
federation was held to be competent to regulate telephone companies by virtue of its 
power over works and undertakings connecting the provinces or extending beyond the 
limits of a province, under the exceptions to provincial power listed in Section 92(10) 
[Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co. (1905) AC 52]. While this particular ruling seems perfectly 
logical, the centralising tendency becomes evident in later decisions where the federation 
was allowed to regulate even those companies operating entirely within provincial limits 
(on the ground that they had the technical capacity to provide national and international 
connections) [Alberta. Government Telephones v. CRTC (1989) 2 SCR 225; Téléphone Guèvremont 
v. Québec (1994) 1 SCR 878]. 
Similarly, the petrification theory in Austria, while usually favouring the Länder due 
to its restrictions on the possible expansion of federal enumerated powers, was relied upon 
to reach a pro-central conclusion in a decision concerning legislative competence over 
radio broadcasting [VfSlg 2721/1954]. The Constitutional Court held that since the radio 
had already been invented when the Constitution was drafted, the framers had to have 
been aware of its existence. And since there was a relation between radio broadcasting and 
the telegraph, the fact that there was no mention of the former in the Constitution meant 
that it was intended to be grouped with the latter. By this rather tortuous reasoning, the 
Court succeeded in adhering to the letter of the petrification theory while actually 
employing a generous interpretation of the federal power in order to accommodate 
national regulation.  
Interestingly, in an earlier decision on the Canadian constitution, the Privy Council 
– soon after elaborating its ‘living tree’ metaphor - had also accepted an expansive 
definition of ‘telegraph’ so as to include radio broadcasting under the federal power in 
Canada, as telegraphs are also listed as exceptions to provincial power under Section 92 
(10) [In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communications in Canada (1932) A.C. 304]. And the 
same generous interpretation of the competence with respect to telegraphs under Section 
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52(v) of the Australian constitution was used as well by the High Court of Australia, with 
the same result [R. v. Brislan (1935) 54 CLR 262]. 
Another aspect of Austrian constitutional doctrine is the concept of ‘intra-systemic’ 
powers, according to which the federal government can legislate on a matter not falling 
directly within the ambit of a ‘petrified’ head of power as long there is a close link between 
the federal law and the original power (Gamper 2005: 16; Taylor 2006: 101).  This 
facilitates a much more generous interpretation of an enumerated power than would 
otherwise be permitted under the petrification theory. 
And finally, the ease with which the Constitution is amended has further diluted the 
pro-Länder effects of the petrification theory in Austria. As the words in the Constitution 
are petrified in their meaning at the time of original enactment, new words introduced by a 
later constitutional amendment are to be understood in the meaning they had at the time of 
the amendment. Since the procedure for constitutional amendment is much simpler in 
Austria than in many other federations, it is much easier for federal powers to be updated 
to meet changing circumstances. And on the whole, amendments to the division of powers 
have indeed been favourable to the federation (Douin 1977: 54-58). 
In the United States and Australia, too, the centrifugal effects of originalism have 
not been strong enough to reverse the well-entrenched tendency towards increasing federal 
power. While the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez [514 U.S. 
549 (1995)] and United States v. Morrison [529 U.S. 598 (2000)] sparked a renewed interest in 
possible limitations on federal commerce clause regulation, it must be noted that they did 
not give rise to a dramatic change in the federal balance of power, as later Supreme Court 
cases did not necessarily continue this trend (Williams 2007). One relevant factor is that it 
would be impossible, as a practical matter, for the Supreme Court to invalidate the entire 
framework of federal regulation established in the decades since the New Deal. The respect 
for judicial precedent is also an important element in constitutional interpretation (Tribe 
2000: 78-85; Tushnet 2006: 40-42); a certain interpretative approach can become part of 
the judicial conventions regarding certain constitutional provisions. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decades-old refusal to admit limits to federal power, while departed from by the 
majority in the two decisions mentioned, remains deeply rooted in American constitutional 
thought. 
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In Australia, the legalism established by the Engineers court was also disturbed 
towards the end of the 20th century, which saw a renewed emphasis on a purposive 
interpretation that gave more consideration to framers’ intentions. But this Australian 
version of the New Originalism showed itself mainly in the field of implied rights, and it 
did not have a major impact on Australian federalism (Greene 2009: 43-49). Recent case-
law has been as favourable – if not more favourable - to the federation as anything that 
went before. For example, in the Work Choices case of 2006 [New South Wales v. 
Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1] the Court upheld a federal law on industrial relations 
under the corporations power. Repeatedly citing Engineers, the majority explicitly rejected 
the idea that one should take the federal balance into account when interpreting the 
constitution.XI 
 
7. Interpretative philosophy and subject matter 
 
The absence of any notable impact on federalism of the originalist/intentionalist 
revival in Australia also suggests that very different, even mutually contradictory 
interpretative approaches may underlie constitutional jurisprudence in different areas. In its 
implied rights jurisprudence, the High Court has shown a much greater willingness to 
adopt a teleological, structural interpretation than is evident in Engineers-style textualism 
(Greene 2009: 43-49; Allan and Aroney 2008: 292-293). Similarly, to take an example from 
a newer federation, the Indian Supreme Court is known for its progressive and expansive 
interpretation of the fundamental rights provisions in the Indian constitution (Jain 2008: 
833); on the other hand, while the Court has recognized federalism as one of the unwritten 
general principles – the “basic structure” – of the constitution, it has adopted a far more 
textual approach towards the resolution of federal-state disputes.  
One apparent reason for these seemingly contradictory approaches is the 
fundamental difference between the interpretation of the federal division of powers and 
the interpretation of provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights. While the latter involves 
the definition of the scope and limits of government power, the former is more concerned 
with the distribution of power between different levels of government within the state, i.e. 
the definition of relative limits of power. When a court interprets the division of legislative 
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competence, one of the two levels of government in the federation retains legislative 
power; in the interpretation of a provision granting individual rights, an expansive 
interpretation implies a restriction of all legislative power (Huscroft 2004: 422).XII  
The reasons for the choice of a particular approach in a particular context are 
manifold, and complex. With respect to fundamental rights, there have been changes in the 
underlying perception of the relation between the individual and the state. In a more 
‘realpolitik’ perspective, inter-institutional rivalry may also be cited as a relevant factor 
sometimes favouring a generally expansive interpretation that restricts legislative power. 
While this is a subject for another study – one that compares the Australian example to 
those of Canada and the United States as well - its general implication is clear: the 
interpretative philosophies adopted by constitutional courts are not constant and may 
change as a function of the subject matter in question. Studies of constitutional 
interpretation must take this into account when comparing the interpretative approaches 
prevalent in different legal systems. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In the final analysis, what does the comparison of constitutional interpretation tell 
us about federal constitutions, and about federalism?  
Judicial interpretation channels the influence of economic, technological and other non-
constitutional developments in a federation, while at the same time exerting its own 
influence in shaping the legal system within which these forces act. As federalism is itself a 
response to political and social realities, this is to be expected, even welcomed; the 
progressive centralisation evident in so many federations is only a further manifestation of 
this dynamic.  
While recognizing the interrelatedness of legal and non-legal factors, the ‘pure’ 
study of constitutional law can be a valid – and valuable – approach to understanding the 
phenomenon of federalism. As mentioned above, the legal order provides a framework 
where the various factors operating in this phenomenon manifest themselves, and it is at 
the same time one of these factors. And so, noting the influence of economic and 
technological developments in federal-state relations and on the interpretation of the 
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constitution should not lead one to overlook the complex nature of these questions, or the 
fact that the evolution of constitutional law is not a direct function of these developments. 
In this perspective, we have seen how the interpretative approach adopted by each 
jurisdiction tends to influence the federal balance. As stated at the beginning of this paper, 
the choice of an originalist or progressive approach involves not merely a certain way of 
looking at the words and expressions used in constitutional provisions, but also a certain 
way of conceiving what a constitution is and what it is meant to do. At the same time, as 
judicial interpretation is also conditioned by constitutional language, a study of the concrete 
terms of these provisions is indispensable to studying the case-law of federalism: the 
manner in which legislative powers are divided in federal constitutions is an important 
factor in how the federal balance evolves. Certain forms of distribution of legislative 
competences, in particular those without enumerated state powers, are more amenable to 
an expansion of federal power. While it is difficult to ‘quantify’ the role played by this 
aspect, the existence of such a role is beyond doubt. The marked differences in the way the 
constitutional resolution of federalism disputes has evolved in federations with very 
different structures of power-allocation are in themselves proof of this phenomenon. 
Thus, if one’s goal is to preserve the balance of power between the federation and 
its constituent units – and it is important to recognize that such a goal would be a 
normative, political choice - interpretative techniques are not in themselves sufficient tools 
without an appropriate structuring of the constitutional division of powers. Other 
federations provide examples of this: the recent German constitutional reform was 
necessitated precisely by the need to better organise the allocation of legislative 
competence between the Bund and the Länder; Switzerland has seen several overhauls of 
its constitutional structure, often motivated in part by the need to clarify and elaborate the 
division of powers. These examples put the role of constitutional interpretation as an 
evolutive factor into perspective; it is only when constituent power is wielded to its fullest 
extent that Dicey’s prediction of judicial predominance may be proved wrong.  
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I A useful overview is provided by (Clark 2002). 
II This is reflected in the fact that the development of the ‘New Originalism’ in American constitutional 
jurisprudence and doctrine roughly corresponded with the rise of the ‘New Federalism’; indeed, one gets the 
impressions that the terms are sometimes used almost interchangeably. 
III In a classic study, J. Brossard identified several different pro-central and pro-provincial periods in the Privy 
Council’s jurisprudence: (Brossard 1968: 169-186). 
IV As is to be expected, how this jurisprudence is characterised varies according to the definition of 
‘originalism’ adopted. Certain writers conceive of Australian legalism as nothing but a form of originalism: see 
for example (Greene 2009). 
V Examples of the later approach are provided by the decisions in Strickland v. Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd. (1971) 
124 CLR 468 and the Work choices case (discussed below).  For a detailed analysis of the reserved powers 
doctrine, see (Allan and Aroney 2008). For an overall discussion of the corporations power, see (Zines 2008: 
107-137) 
VI Good examples of the early State-centred approach are provided by the High Court’s decisions in Attorney-
General (NSW) ex rel Tooth & Co Ltd. v. Brewery Employees' Union of NSW (1908) 6 CLR 469 and Huddart, Parker 
& Co. Pty Ltd. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
VII As suggested in the final section of the paper, however, this does not always hold true in other areas of 
constitutional doctrine.  
VIII Some scholars note that the existence of two relatively long and detailed lists of powers has tended to give 
a greater importance to judicial interpretation in determining the balance of intergovernmental relations in 
Canada; see for example (Hodgetts 1974). 
IX This has of course been the subject of extensive comment in each of the federations mentioned. However, 
detailed and in-depth comparative studies of this phenomenon – as opposed to brief remarks - are 
surprisingly rare. For one such attempt, see (Orban 1984). A recent study undertakes an empirical analysis of 
the broad phenomenon of ‘legal unification’ in several different federations: (Halberstam and Reimann 2010) 
X The centralising or decentralising effects of technological developments in the larger social and political 
context are more complex and ambiguous. The nationalisation of information and communication systems 
tends to be a centralising factor, but some scholars argue that the spread of these systems and the growth of 
interactive technologies may have the effect of decentralising power to citizens: see generally (Dutton 1982, 
110-111). 
XI Some commentators see the Work Choices decision as a clear abandonment of originalism in Australia; see 
(Gisonda 2007). The author notes that only the dissenting judgement of Callinan J. explicitly endorsed 
originalism as the best interpretative approach. 
XII In the same logic, G. Sawyer observes: “If the purpose of the liberal interpretation is to extend the range 
of competence of a legislature – usually the Centre legislature – then in dealing with prohibitions it is 
necessary to narrow the meaning syndrome of the relevant class expressions.” (Sawer 1969: 177). While I do 
not explore this subject here, it is worth noting that, in general, scholars tend to hold the view that the 
development of fundamental rights in federal systems favours the federal government; see for example 
(Morton 1995; Orban 1991: 72-76; Bothe 1991: 130-131). 
 
 
